Emmanuel Macron's election as President of the Republic and the formation of a government that includes a mix of politicians from parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, as well as a significant share of non-partisan ministers, has been hailed by numerous commentators as an unprecedented overhaul of France's political life. This article examines how the two cabinets formed under prime minister Édouard Philippe in the shadow of the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections compare to previous governments in the Fifth Republic. The analysis reveals a less than revolutionary break with previous patterns of government size, channels of ministerial recruitment, portfolio allocation, gender balance and ethnic diversity.
The president and the prime minister appointment
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic places the president at the centre of the government formation process. Article 8 grants the head of state unconstrained power to select the prime minister and to appoint all other cabinet members on his or her proposal. Thus, favourable circumstances, such as the support of a majority in parliament, allow the head of state to appoint a loyal and/or at least subordinate prime minister and take control over the government (Elgie 2013: 20) . Several other constitutional provisions increase the president's authority over the executive decision-making process. For example, the right to chair cabinet meetings (under Article 9) allows the head of state to set the agenda and influence policy-making indirectly (Knapp and Wright 2006: 89) . Article 5 grants the power to ensure the proper functioning of public authorities through arbitration to the head of state. This provision has been interpreted as a firm basis for the President's ability to keep a tight grip over state institutions (Carcassonne 2011: 55-6) . In addition to the basis for presidential leadership provided by the Constitution, the direct election of the president ensures that the government's policy agenda is set by the president, while the legislative election following shortly after the presidential one is likely to provide the majority needed to pass the government's programme in parliament (Elgie 2013: 23) . All these conditions for presidential pre-eminence were met in 2017, when Emmanuel Macron took office on the basis of a decisive victory in the presidential election, which was consolidated by the legislative election that granted his newly established party an overall majority in parliament. As a result, the new government and its policy programme were regarded as a direct expression of President Macron's political project.
Broadly speaking, French prime ministers taking office during periods of presidential dominance have been known to fall in two categories: those appointed at the beginning of the president's term, who are representative for the coalition that supported the president in the second election round; and those appointed mid-way through the presidential term, who are personally loyal to the president (Portelli 1997: 22) . In general, prime ministerial appointments have been instrumental in widening the presidential majority and/or appeasing tensions in a divided coalition or presidential party. For example, President Pompidou's choice of ChabanDelmas as his prime minister in 1969 signalled the opening of the Gaullist party towards the centre-right (Portelli 1997: 22) . Similarly, Michel Rocard was chosen by François Mitterrand in 1988 at the outset of his second term due to his ability to widen the narrow left-wing majority towards the centre (Knapp and Wright 2006: 81) . In 1974, President Giscard d'Estaing appointed Jacques Chirac as his first prime minister instead of choosing a premier from his centrist UDF to acknowledge the role played by the Gaullist party in the presidential campaign.
Under different circumstances, Jacques Chirac also started his second term in 2002 with a "gesture" to the middle ground, as he picked Jean-Pierre Raffarin as prime minister, although or precisely because he represented the centrist, non-Gaullist part of his newly formed Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) (Gaffney 2010: 178) . To accommodate a fractious and rebellious UMP presidential party, Nicolas Sarkozy chose François Fillon as prime minister, who was a leading member of the party and had supported his presidential bid without being a long-time loyalist (Cole 2012: 317; Elgie 2013: 26) . As opposed to his predecessors, François
Hollande overlooked the balance of power in the highly factionalised Socialist Party (PS) when forming his first government in 2012. Jean-Marc Ayrault, a loyalist with no ministerial experience but who had been the president of the PS parliamentary group since 1997, was preferred as prime minister to the party leader Martine Aubry, who was the most experienced and popular choice as head of government (Murray 2013: 209) . Moreover, President Hollande chose to populate the government with his supporters from the presidential primary instead of leaning on the majoritarian axis that had led the party since 2008 (Dolez 2015: 75) . Ignoring the balance of power between the party factions proved to have far-reaching consequences for the working relationship between the executive and the presidential majority in parliament.
At first sight, one might be hard pressed to place Édouard Philippe, the mayor of Le
Havre from the right-wing Les Républicains (LR) who took office in May 2017 as President Macron's first prime minister, either in the category of "rassembleurs" or in that of loyalists. A freshman in the National Assembly but with considerable experience as an elected official at different levels in local administration, Philippe was not a leading member of the LR party. He was, however, closely associated with Alain Juppé, whom he actively supported during the 2016 presidential primary of the centre-right. While Philippe refrained from endorsing Macron during the electoral campaign, which made him the first prime minister to take office under the Fifth Republic without actively supporting the incoming president, Juppé was unequivocal in his support for the candidate of the La République en Marche (LREM) ahead of the run-off.
Two other members of the LR party were nominated in Philippe's government: Bruno Le Maire, a close collaborator of former prime minister Dominique de Villepin and agriculture minister under François Fillon, who went on to fight both Fillon and Nicolas Sarkozy for the presidency of the UMP party and the LR presidential nomination, was appointed as economy minister; and Gérald Darmanin, a rising star in the LR party close to Sarkozy, obtained the budget portfolio. As opposed to the PS, which was badly damaged during the presidential election and was bracing for a wipeout in the general election, the Republicans were still expected to return a significant group in the National Assembly. Thus, Macron's choice for Édouard Philippe as his first prime minister and the appointment of LR members associated with the main factions in the LR party reflected his own "gesture" intended to broaden political appeal and provide right-wing voters with sufficient incentives to support LREM candidates when it came to duels with the left or the extreme right.
The cross-party government
During the presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron promised to appoint a fifteenmember government that would include politicians from the left, centre, and right, as well as non-political personalities (Coquaz 2017) . To fit the bill, cabinet nominations from the rightwing LR were balanced by the appointment of two heavyweights from the Socialist Party:
Gérard Collomb, a long-standing member of the Socialist Party, with extensive experience in both houses of parliament and a local official for over two decades, was appointed interior minister; while Jean-Yves Le Drian, who had held the defence portfolio in all cabinets formed under François Hollande's presidency, was promoted to foreign affairs. Philippe's first cabinet also included two members from the Radical Party of the Left (PRG), the traditional ally of the Socialists: Jacques Mézard, an experienced local official and member of the Senate since 2008, obtained the agriculture portfolio; while Anick Girardin, who had previously served in the Valls and Cazeneuve governments, acquired the overseas ministry. The pre-electoral coalition with the centrist MoDem party translated in the appointment of its leader, François Bayrou, as justice minister. His second in command in the party hierarchy, Marielle de Sarnez, was also appointed to cabinet as a delegated minister for European affairs. Emmanuel Macron's La République en Marche (LREM) party was also represented in Édouard Philippe's first cabinet, although less prominently than it had usually been the case for the president's party during previous spells of presidential dominance. Only two LREM members joined the government as full ministers: Richard Ferrand, a long-standing member of the Socialist Party who had joined the En Marche! movement since its early take-off in April 2016 and served as its secretary general, was appointed minister for regions; while Sylvie Goulard, an MEP for MoDem since 2009 who had also joined LREM in 2016, was named as defence minister -the only woman in a high-profile post. Three other LREM representatives joined the government as secretaries of state: Christophe Castaner, who was Emmanuel Macron's spokesperson during the presidential campaign, became government spokesperson and also took charge over the executive's relations with parliament; Marlène Schiappa, a successful feminist blogger and deputy mayor for Mans, was given responsibility for gender equality (a similar role she had played in Emmanuel Macron's campaign team); and Mounir Mahjoubi, a 33-year old who contributed to François Hollande's presidential campaign and was a PS member before joining LREM in early 2017, took charge over digital economy.
Philippe's cabinet also seemed to carry out Emmanuel Macron's pledge of political renewal, as half of its members were drawn from the 'civil society' as experts in their respective fields. The most prominent of non-partisan appointments was that of Nicolas Hulot, the bestknown environmentalist in France, as minister of ecology and solidarity, a portfolio that also included full responsibility over transports and energy. Hulot, who had unsuccessfully Other non-partisan ministers obtained the health, culture, labour, education, research, and sports portfolios, as well as two junior minister posts related to transports and disability rights.
Nevertheless, as most of the "civil society" representatives could be linked to the main political parties (Pommiers 2017) , there were also doubts that a genuine break with the public policies conducted by previous right-wing and left-wing governments could be achieved (Bedock 2017) , as well as fears that their opposed political views on key policies might be difficult to rein in by Emmanuel Macron and Édouard Philippe (Chapuis 2017) .
As anticipated by the literature on presidential coattails (Shugart 1995; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Golder 2006; Elgie et al. 2014) , the honeymoon legislative election held one month later confirmed the outcome of the presidential election and returned a solid majority for the newly elected president. LREM won 309 seats in the 577-seat National Assembly, an outright majority, while MoDem won 43 seats. The two parties decided to maintain their governing alliance, which technically made the government an oversized coalition. Moreover, the president kept the partnership with compatible factions from the LR and PS on board. 
Government size and ministerial hierarchy
As already mentioned, during the presidential campaign Emmanuel Macron pledged to form a "restrained" government that would include fifteen members at most. How unusual are smallsized cabinets compared to standard patterns of government formation in France? In general, the size and composition of governments in the Fifth Republic has varied considerably from one cabinet to another. Much of this complexity is generated by the existence of different classes of ministers (Duhamel 2011: 622) . The ministerial hierarchy is laid out in a presidential decree that accompanies the appointment of each new government. Apart from the "Premier ministre" and ordinary "Ministres" responsible for a clearly delimited portfolio, cabinets may include "Ministres d'État", the highest rank reserved for senior politicians, and "Ministres délégués". The latter are responsible for specific domains within larger portfolios under the authority of the prime minister or other cabinet members. Minister of state titles are often granted to senior politicians from coalition partners, to acknowledge their party's involvement in the core executive decision-making. However, the only concrete power conferred to state ministers is the ability to organise inter-ministerial meetings, just like the prime minister. The extended government structure may also include "Secrétaires d'Etat" (and a High commissioner under Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency), who have considerably less power than full ministers.
State secretaries do not have their own budget, cannot sign decrees, and may attend cabinet meetings only when topics related to their jurisdiction are on the agenda (Delrue and Vaudano 2017) . As a result, these positions are more likely to be allocated to middle-rank politicians, independents, and women.
By and large, the unwritten rules regarding the distribution of ministerial ranks seem to have been followed in Édouard Philippe's first government, which included three state ministers: Gérard Collomb, the most senior representative of the left; François Bayrou, the leader of the centrist MoDem; and Nicolas Hulot, as the representative of the 'civil society'. In this way, one representative of the right, left, centre, and 'civil society' received a front-row place in the cabinet (though none of these positions were occupied by women). As in the past, the minister of state rank singled out the political heavyweights in cabinet. Not any member of a political party can obtain it and its attachment to a cabinet portfolio indicates the political weight of the seat-holder first and only second the prominence of a policy area. Thus, when The average government size is 33.6 (prime ministers were not included in this count). This benchmark is indicated by the vertical orange line, so that each government can be easily compared to the general average. The bottom line regarding the hierarchy of ministerial posts is that appointments at delegated ministers or state secretary level, which do not exert full control over a ministerial portfolio, are one way to foster efficiency in the ministerial councils by reducing the number of full ministers and increasing the number of lower-ranked appointments that are designed to provide specialised support to senior ministers. These appointments may also be used by presidents or prime ministers as gifts of patronage offering fast-track promotion to governmentlevel to loyal middle-level party members or political outsiders, like independents or women, that can be also easily withdrawn (Murray 2013: 208) . Thus, to understand the distribution of key posts in the government, it might be more useful to focus on the size of the core executive.
In fact, the average number of full ministers across all governments is 17.6, almost half than that including delegated ministers and state secretaries. As the vertical green line in Figure 1 indicates, there is much less variation across governments when it comes to the number of full ministers. From this perspective, the two cabinets formed under Édouard Philippe's cabinets are much closer to the norm.
Portfolio allocation and ministerial importance
One way to evaluate how governing partners divided cabinet payoffs is by comparing the relationship between the amount of resources they contribute to the ruling coalition and the share of cabinet seats they receive in exchange (Gamson 1961: 376) . Although political scientists expect formateur parties (i.e. the ones that get to move first in the game of government formation) to secure more than their fair share of cabinet posts (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Ansolabehere et al. 2005) , empirical studies find that the proportion of ministries each coalition member receives is nearly proportional to the legislative seats it contributes to the government coalition (Warwick and Druckman 2006) . The Fifth Republic is actually one of the few cases where the proportionality relationship holds in its strict interpretation, in that the linkage of seat shares and portfolio shares comes closes to the one-to-one hypothesised relationship than in any other country in Western Europe (Bucur 2016) . However, linking legislative seat share and portfolio shares would make little sense this time around given the synthesis of the left, right, and centre carried out by Emmanuel Macron, who put together an executive team dominated by non-political cabinet members. Nevertheless, since not all cabinet posts carry the same weight, one can compare the size of the ministerial prize seized by each bloc by considering the importance of each portfolio.
Previous research has constructed cross-national measures of portfolio importance using expert measurements of portfolio salience (Druckman and Warwick 2005; Druckman and Roberts 2008) . A country-specific measure of portfolio importance in the Fifth French Republic has also been developed based on the ordres protocolaires that accompany the appointment of each new government and list cabinet members and their jurisdictions in hierarchical order (Bucur 2016) . As the rankings record changes from one cabinet to another, such as ministerial promotions, demotions, and sideways moves, these context-sensitive sources also capture variation in the importance of portfolios from one government to another. As a result, a party's share of the ministerial prize can be re-estimated in each government or after a major cabinet reshuffle. Thus, as opposed to the expert survey estimates, the ministerial rankings can be used to determine salience scores for single posts in each government, as well as mean estimates for the entire period of time a given portfolio appeared in government. This measure can also be used to assess the distribution of ministerial importance to the political blocs represented in Emmanuel Macron's government.
The following steps were taken to estimate the importance of portfolios included in the two cabinets formed in the shadow of the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections. By and large, the data in Figure 2 confirms most commentators' views on the distribution of important portfolios to the main parties of the left and right. Thus, although independent ministers held half of the posts in Édouard Philippe's initial cabinet (left-hand panel in Figure 2 ), their importance was generally lower than that of portfolios allocated to political representatives. In fact, apart from Nicolas Hulot's portfolio, which was ranked 3 rd on the ministerial ladder, the posts with jurisdiction over social policies held by independent ministers were placed in the second half of the ranking. From this point of view, the distribution of portfolios confirmed old patterns which saw ministers advancing to cabinet through political channels obtaining more important posts that those coming to cabinet from the civil service (Gaxie 1986: 68-9) . In contrast, although only two PS members joined the government, the ranking of the two key portfolios they were allocated as 2 nd (i.e. interior) and 6 th (i.e. foreign affairs) in the 19-seat cabinet meant their ministerial prize was more valuable in absolute terms than that of any other party. By comparison, the Left Radicals were also allocated two portfolios, but their ranking on the 13 th (i.e. agriculture) and 16 th (i.e. overseas) places lowered the overall prize value. Similarly, the allocation of the prime ministership to the right-wing LR was balanced by the placement of their other two cabinet posts on the 10 th (i.e. economy) and Although the cabinet formed after the legislative election did not alter significantly the political equilibrium, the data in the right-hand panel in Figure 2 suggests some adjustments in the distribution of ministerial importance. The parties having the most to lose from the June reshuffle were LREM and MoDem, as their ministers left the government amid corruption allegations. Both parties made only one appointment to the cabinet. LREM exchanged the defence and regions ministries (ranked 5 th and 7 th ) with the agriculture post (ranked 13 th ).
However, due to the increase in the number of state secretaries in the second cabinet, LREM improved its share of government seats to almost one quarter, holding one full ministry and six state secretaries out of the extended cabinet's thirty posts. That was still considerably less than the share of cabinet portfolios a formateur party with an absolute majority in parliament would be expected to keep for itself.
While MoDem remained an unambiguous part of the presidential majority, the party lost its central position in the core executive. François Bayrou and Marielle de Sarnez were not replaced by other MoDem representatives at the justice ministry and the state secretariat for European affairs the party had held in Édouard Philippe's initial cabinet. Nor was the party compensated with another full ministry. Instead, a delegated minister and a state secretary were assigned to the interior and defence ministries. Thus, rather than claiming separate portfolios that might have been of lesser importance, MoDem seems to have opted for shadowing two of the most salient ministries in Philippe's second cabinet.
The independent bloc seems to have benefitted the most from the cabinet reshuffle. 
Ministerial selection and political experience
The two governments formed under Édouard Philippe gave the impression of a breach with previous patterns of ministerial recruitment because they brought together representatives of different political families of the left and right, while also giving considerable room to unelected individuals and experts unknown to the public. However, a more attentive look reveals that the mix of politicians appointed had long elective careers at both national and local levels.
Similarly, many of the politically non-affiliated members of the cabinet had followed senior civil service career paths and had considerable experience as advisers in ministerial cabinets. By and large, while there is no denying that fewer members in the new government were drawn from the parliamentary pool than before, it might be too early to conclude that a The new ministers do not seem to completely lack cabinet experience either.
According to the data in Figure 2 , at least one third of the ministers in both cabinets had either The near absence of political heavyweights from government separates Édouard Philippe's cabinet from its predecessors, as the importance of political militantism as a channel for ministerial appointments had gradually increased since the early days of the Fifth Republic. For example, the proportion of national party elites appointed to cabinets almost tripled from 1958 until the mid-1980s, and reached a peak of 77% under Mitterrand's first presidential term (Gaxie 1986: 64) . Similarly, the cabinets formed under Lionel Jospin and François Fillon were dominated by incumbent or former party executives.
Overall, the composition of the new government displayed a mixed picture in terms of political experience. While experienced politicians make up a smaller group than before, a nonnegligible number of cabinet members followed the conventional career path to executive office, which normally starts at local level and involves winning a general election before advancing to the cabinet. Moreover, the fact that both cabinets have boasted a greater share of non-partisan members than before could hardly hide that fact many of them were no strangers to politics. According to Le Monde, only five of the 23 members in Philippe's initial cabinet had not worked with political parties before (Pommiers 2017) .
Gender balance and ethnic diversity
In spite of appointing a parity cabinet, President Macron's early delivery on his gender parity pledge was seen as disappointing (Dupont 2017) . At first sight, this reaction might seem surprising, given that half of the new ministers appointed in the two cabinets were women (discounting the male prime minister). However, although it might be too early to say that parity governments have become the norm in French politics, a high number of women ministers no longer impresses. For a comparative overview, Figure 4 presents the percentage of women ministers appointed in all French governments during the Fifth Republic, which includes both full cabinet posts and secretaries of state positions. As this data indicates, the appointment of women ministers remained rather exceptional until the 1990s. In fact, the first woman to be appointed as a full minister was Simone Veil, who took office as health minister in Jacques
Chirac's 1974 cabinet. The situation remained largely unchanged until Édith Cresson was appointed prime minister briefly during 1991-1992. After the mid-1990s, though, the appointment of women to government increased significantly and has generally surpassed the representation of women in parliament (Murray 2013 (Murray , 2016 . Thus, while Emmanuel Macron's parity cabinet stands out in comparison with the average French government, it seems to be following closely the trend started by Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, who also vowed to ensure gender parity in their governments.
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Since 1995, when Alain Juppé nominated women for almost a third of the available positions in his government but failed to give them real power to influence executive decisionmaking (Sineau 2011: 167) , attention has shifted to the importance of ministries allocated to women. Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy's initial cabinet was praised not only because it included a record number of women, seven out of a cabinet of 15, but also because they were given highranking positions, including the interior and justice ministries. Nevertheless, in the post-election expansion of the government and then throughout Nicolas Sarkozy's term, the number of women ministers declined to a third of the government and many of the initial high-profile figures gradually disappeared from public view (Murray 2009: 32) . François Hollande also delivered on his commitment to have an equal number of women and men in government.
However, he was criticised for appointing relatively junior women to cabinet and for allocating them considerably less powerful ministries (Murray 2013: 209) . Therefore, Emmanuel humiliating (Dupont 2017) . Moreover, while the male ministers had been active in political parties, most women except for Sylvie Goulard (LREM), Marielle de Sarnez (MoDem) and Anick Girardin (PRG) were drawn from outside party politics. As a result, while male ministers had some previous ministerial experience, most women except for Anick Girardin had at most acted as advisers in ministerial cabinets. On the other hand, the fact that all women ministers were senior public servants and renowned experts in the fields, made them less susceptible to criticism from male rivals and to the vulnerability associated with the traditional "fait du prince" (Murray 2009: 33) .
Following the post-election expansion of the government to 30 members, 15 of whom were women, a fairer distribution of portfolios was achieved, as the justice ministry passed from François Bayrou to Nicole Belloubet. Nevertheless, as most of the other portfolios did not change hands and the new cabinet members who joined the government were state secretaries, the balance of power between male and female ministers did not change significantly. One can also use the measure of portfolio importance introduced above to determine a more precise distribution of ministerial importance between male and female ministers. Previous research has found that, on average, the ministries received by women in Jean-Marc Ayrault's first cabinet were half as important as the those allocated to men (Little 2012) . The same conclusion can be drawn from the boxplots presented in Figure 5 , which illustrate the distribution of ministerial importance between male and female ministers in the two cabinets formed by Édouard Philippe. As in the previous analysis, only full cabinet positions were included in this analysis (i.e. full ministers and delegated ministers). The importance of ministries is assessed based on their position in the ordre protocolaire. The lower importance of portfolios allocated to women is explained by the fact that only the defence ministry was placed in the top half of the ranking initially, followed by the justice department in the post-election cabinet. In both cabinets, women dominated the bottom half of the ministerial hierarchy. If the measure of portfolio importance used mean estimates for the entire period of time a portfolio appeared in government during the Fifth Republic instead of focusing on the ministerial rankings in the last two cabinets, then the gap between the importance of ministries allocated to men and women in the last two governments is reduced, but male ministers are still favoured.
[ Figure shown that minority ministers appointed to French cabinets, a vast majority of whom had been women, have had a mixed record of policy influence due to their short tenures and clashes of personality and political ideology (Murray 2016; Garrett 2017 ). It will be interesting to see if minority diversity appointments to cabinet will have a stronger impact on policy-making under the new presidency, giving rise to minority-specific policies, and if they will come at the expense of symbolic appointments to cabinet of ethnic minority women.
Conclusion
Did Emmanuel Macron's new cabinet break with previous patterns of ministerial appointments in France or was it business as usual in government formation? The answer is somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, the formation of a cross-party cabinet was associated with a higher degree of change than Nicolas Sarkozy's 2007 "ouverture" policy, which had resulted in the appointment to government of several politicians associated with the centre-left parties, such as Hervé Morin and Bernard Kouchner. The composition of François Fillon's cabinet was perceived as a strategic move to split the opposition and oppose arguments that voters should opt for a left-leaning legislature to balance Nicolas Sarkozy's right-wing agenda (Kam and Indridason 2009: 47) . In contrast, rather than merely opening the government to one political side, Emmanuel Macron was praised for achieving a genuine synthesis of the centre, centreright, and centre-left in government and promoting the renewal of political class through the inclusion of a non-negligible share of non-partisan experts in government (Chapuis 2017) . That said, it remains to be seen how long independent ministers, who lack their own power bases and depend on Emmanuel Macron for their positions, will last in office and if they will start disappearing from public view in the next cabinet reshuffles.
On the other hand, the new government did not really break with previous patterns of ministerial selection and portfolio allocation. Ministers drawn from the main political parties obtained the most important portfolios, while non-partisan members were given responsibilities over lower profiles policy areas. With the notable exception of the defence and justice portfolios, women and representatives of ethnic minorities received less powerful ministries as well. The composition of the new government also displayed a mixed picture in terms of political experience. While experienced politicians made up a smaller group than before, a nonnegligible number of cabinet members had followed conventional career paths, coming to government as parliamentarians, mayors, party executives, or cabinet advisers. Ultimately, though, it remains to be seen whether ministers with opposing political views will ensure the continuity of previous policies or whether they will be able to carry out Emmanuel Macron's project of political change. 
